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Some Too (or Blessedly) Short
Responses to Five Thoughtful
Readers
Sanford Levinson
First things first: I am obviously grateful both to the editors of the
Pepperdine Law Review for organizing this symposium and to the
participants for their careful readings and observations. For better and, no
doubt, worse, I do not have the time (even if the Review had the pages) for
the kind of response that each of the pieces deserves. Instead, I will confine
myself to literally one or two observations about each of them, with the hope
that they will engender further conversation about a topic that will inevitably
remain both of theoretical interest and (perhaps all-too-) practical politics. I
will adopt the "alphabetic principle" in addressing my interlocutors.
Paul Finkelman is both a friend of long duration-a term, I have been
told, that is better, once people reach a certain age, than "old friend"-and
one of my central teachers with regard to the reality of slavery as part of the
American political and constitutional tradition. It is not surprising that he
has written a powerful essay criticizing the conventional historiography of
"The Compromise of 1850." I could not agree with him more strongly that
one's response to that compromise (and others) involving slavery, including,
of course, the initial set of compromises in 1787, depends very strongly on
necessarily counter-factual beliefs as to what would have happened had
there been no such compromises.'
As have I argued elsewhere, 2 what distinguishes "deliberative
exchange" from "bargaining" is that the latter need not involve any changes
of mind about the underlying merits of one's position, only that the political
circumstances suggest making certain concessions, however painful, in order
to achieve other purposes (including maintaining civil peace).' I confess
that I am one of those people who believed that secession would have been

1. Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant With Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV.
845 (2011).
2. See Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in "Dialogue": A View from American States,
59 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
3. Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 821 (2011).
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much more likely to succeed in 1850 than was the case a decade later; I am
therefore fascinated by the material Finkelman brings to bear to suggest it
was the South that was indeed significantly strengthened, relative to the rest
of the Union, during the decade of the 1850s. 4 I do not have enough
knowledge of my own to say whether I am completely convinced by his
argument, but I am positive that, not for the first time, he has issued a
challenge to which other historians must respond. And, as suggested above,
acceptance of his analysis would necessarily have implications for one's
views on the Compromise of 1850 (for starters).
My only disagreement with Finkelman comes, perhaps ironically, from
his very first sentence: "Professor Levinson argues with some passion for
compromise in constitutional law."5 I would have written that I argued,
surely with passion, for the necessity of grappling with the importanceindeed, near-ubiquity-of compromise in constitutional law. Some of these
compromises are easily defensible; others might indeed have been
sufficiently "rotten" to merit rejection, even if other, merely "bad" ones, are
perhaps tolerable given likely alternatives in the absence of such
compromises.
Mark Graber is another friend of long duration, as well as a major
influence on my own thought on each and every topic of American
constitutional development. It is not the case that we always agree, but there
is literally no one whose criticisms I take more seriously. In this instance,
though, I am not sure that we disagree in any fundamental respect. I take the
key sentence in his comment to be that "[s]ome protection for constitutional
evils is the fate of ongoing constitutional projects in [a] diverse society." 6
One might well cite one of Graber's own heroes, James Madison, who
reminded Edward Everett in a letter toward the end of Madison's long life
that "[f]ree constitutions will rarely if ever be formed without reciprocal
concessions; without articles conditioned on & balancing each other."' For
Madison, of course, one of these concessions was the necessary "evil" of
equal voting power in the Senate.8 It is difficult for me to believe that
anyone could seriously gainsay either Graber or Madison.
My own central example, obviously, was drawn from the pained history
of chattel slavery as part of our constitutional heritage. Graber effectively
does a fast forward and addresses the unhappiness that many-perhaps

4. See Finkelman, supranote 1, at 851-53.
5. Id. at 845.
6. Mark A. Graber, ConstitutionalDemocracy, Human Dignity, and Entrenched Evil, 38 PEPP.
L. REv. 889, 902 (2011).
7. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in FEDERALISM 100, 104
(Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. ed., 2010).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 331 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) ) (referring to the
Senate as a "lesser evil," the greater evil being the prospect of no Constitution at all should the small
states reject the project of constitutional reformation).
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most-thoughtful Americans feel about our current abortion policy, though,
obviously, the reasons for the unhappiness are not shared, insofar as those
who view abortion as murder occupy a quite different intellectual universe
from those who view access to the full range of reproductive choices as an
essential part of recognizing what it means to be an autonomous person.9
Though it is, in fact, impossible for me to take truly seriously those who
object to the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") as unconstitutional, let
alone "evil," I know all too well that some people I not only like personally
but also respect as serious and committed thinkers do indeed view the
required purchase of medical insurance as a violation of overriding
libertarian principles.
How are such cleavages resolved in pluralistic societies? Should, for
example, the losers in a political process necessarily submit to the winners,
even if, as is inevitably the case, any existing process, very much including
our own, is deeply flawed from the perspective of some "ideal" kind of
political theory?o I do not think that losers have such obligations. Or, if
there are such obligations, they are, at most, primafacie, and thus subject to
being overridden by sufficiently good reasons. The state, after all, gets to
override various constitutional norms by evoking "compelling state
Why shouldn't free citizens of a "Republican Form of
interests."
Government," which the Constitution announces as its aspiration-not to
mention the achievement of a society that will "establish Justice"-be able
equally to enunciate their own sense of "compelling public purposes" that
justify civil disobedience? I take it that Graber would argue that one should,
generally speaking, restrain such impulses in the name of preserving civil
peace, including peace with persons one regards as in some sense committed
to "evil" projects. And I think he is quite right in suggesting such caution
(or prudence). But I am confident that he would reach a limit and become
Both
"uncompromising" in his commitment to overriding norms.
out
is
to
figure
task
Our
claims.
their
have
compromise and intransigence
circumstances.
which should prevail and under what
Carrie Menkel-Meadow is, like Steven Smith, someone I have long
admired, though I have not had the opportunity to develop the same kind of
colleagueship with them as I have with Finkelman, Graber, or Richard
Weisberg. That obviously does not make her comments of lesser interest or
importance. Menkel-Meadow suggests, I think accurately, that there is no
algorithm that can tell us when one disposition should triumph over the

9. See Graber, supranote 6.
10. See Sanford Levinson, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
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other. Though "compromise" obviously raises the most serious of moral
questions, we must "examine it and evaluate it, in variable or 'relative, no
deracinated or 'universal' circumstances."" That being said, she offers
some valuable rules of thumb by which to determine when acquiescence
might be trumped by commitment to particular values. Thus, she notes that
"'one-off Constitutional compromises (such as slavery and the Senate) must
be judged and measured differently than those that allow for "repetition,
correction, accountability and reciprocity norms, as in other political
processes."1 2 What makes a constitutional compromise "one-off," as a
matter of practicality, may be the particular difficulty of amending a given
constitution. As it happens, the United States has the most difficult
constitution to amend of any such document on the planet; just as relevant is
to note that each of the fifty American state constitutions is easier to amend
than is the United States Constitution. 3 Compromise might thus be less
costly in systems that allow for easier changes of mind. Indeed, one might
read Menkel-Meadow as suggesting that, generally speaking, classic
parliamentary sovereignty might have its advantages over the American kind
of constitutionalism inasmuch as the latter may build too much rigidity into
our polity. Even if that is not the case-as may well be true-we might still
wish to "deconstitutionalize" many of our controversies and thus at least
question the primacy of judges offering inevitably controversial-and often
altogether implausible-interpretations of what Justice Jackson memorably
described as "the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights"' 4 or, for that
matter, the Equal Protection Clause. The most extreme version of this
argument would abolish judicial review." More moderately, one might
simply support a reduced degree of judicial "finality," either through
allowing "overrides" of Supreme Court decisions by, say, supermajorities of
Congress or by easing the process of constitutional amendment.
Steven Smith offers a characteristically close and thoughtful reading of
my essay. His introductory pages sound very much like Max Weber's
famous injunction, in his classic essay Politics as a Vocation, that political
leaders must reject the "ethics of ultimate ends" in favor of the "ethic of
responsibility" for one's society.' 6 More recently, Michael Walzer defended
the propriety of political leaders being willing to "dirty" their hands in
11. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Variable Morality of Constitutional (and Other) Compromises:
A Comment on Sanford Levinson's Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 903, 905
(2011).
12. Id. at 907.
13. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 254-62

(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
14. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
15.

See Mark V. Tushnet, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

16. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/
lecture/politicsvocation.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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making inevitable compromises attached to responsible stewardship.17 I
happen to agree with Walzer. 8 But, obviously, one should dirty one's
hands, especially with regard to "rotten compromises," only if there really
are "compelling" reasons, of the highest magnitude, for doing so. Smith
presumably agrees with Menkel-Meadow that what is called for (nonpejoratively) is casuistry rather than the application of a universalist
algorithm, and he provides just such casuistic analysis of Lincoln's
particular response to the dilemmas presented by chattel slavery.
The key to his argument is to accept chattel slavery as an existing evil,
rather than one introduced to America by either the Framers of the
Constitution or, even more certainly, by Lincoln. Thus, he in effect takes
Margalit to task for conflating "establishment" with "maintenance."l 9 There
is surely something to this-we distinguish, after all, between "adverse
possession" and new attempts at trespass-but I think that Smith
overestimates its importance. At the very least, returning to the important
point of Finkelman's essay, one must have a firm sense of what is
empirically possible and to move to disestablishingexisting evils as quickly
as reasonably possible, where "reasonably," of course, invites a certain kind
of cost-benefit analysis in terms of calculating likely resistance, etc. Perhaps
one can defend Lincoln for not being a Garrisonian advocating secession
from a Union with slaveholders. But I am not so clear that one can defend
Lincoln's callow defense of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 as necessary
compliance with the "deal" made by the 1787 Framers or his support of the
original Thirteenth Amendment, the "Corwin Amendment," that would have
guaranteed to those states in which slavery already existed its maintenance
in perpetuity unless the slave states chose on their own to abolish the
(wicked) institution. I would also be interested in Smith's response to
Graber's powerful book, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil, 20 Which I read as suggesting that perhaps there was something to be

said for James Buchanan's view, expressed in his final Message to
Congress, 21 that secession, although illegal, did not merit a forceful response
by the remainder of the United States:
17. Michael Walzer, The Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 61, 64-74
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
18. See Sanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture: An Introduction, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION
23, 38 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
19. Steven D. Smith, Lessons from Lincoln, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 915 (2011).
20. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCorr AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
21.

PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 264 (5th ed. 2006)

(quoting James Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Dec. 3,
1860), THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=29501
(last visited Feb. 25, 2011)).
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[I]t may be safely asserted that the power to make war against a

State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the
Constitution. Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a
State; how are we to govern it afterwards? Shall we hold it as a
province and govern it by despotic power? In the nature of things,
we could not by physical force control the will of the people and
compel them to elect Senators and Representatives to Congress and
to perform all the other duties depending upon their own volition
and required from the free citizens of a free State as a constituent
member of the Confederacy.
But if we possessed this power, would it be wise to exercise it
under existing circumstances? The object would doubtless be to
preserve the Union. War would not only present the most effectual
means of destroying it, but would vanish all hope of its peaceable
reconstruction. Besides, in the fraternal conflict a vast amount of
blood and treasure would be expended, rendering future
reconciliation between the States impossible. In the meantime, who
can foretell what would be the sufferings and privations of the
people during its existence?
The fact is that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can
never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If
it cannot live in the affections of the people, it must one day

perish.22
What, precisely, is "wrong" with this argument, unless it is, of course,
that acceptance would have tolerated the entrenchment of slavery in the
seceding states? But, of course, that is exactly what Lincoln was willing to
do via his support of the Corwin Amendment. So does Smith-and other
defenders of Lincoln-share his "Union mysticism" that regards the
maintenance of the existing United States as the most overriding of all
values? Why is that the line at which one adopts obduracy instead of
compromise? (Quite obviously, as Smith recognizes, I am more comfortable
with question marks than with periods.)
Finally, there is another friend of long duration with whom I have often
engaged over many years. Engagement, of course, is not synonymous with
agreement, and Weisberg continues to be frustrated with my over-tolerance
for compromise; he sees this as equal to the betrayal of truly fundamental
values that deserve our overriding allegiance. If I am obsessed by slavery
and its role in American constitutional history, he is obsessed by the rise of
Nazism in Germany and then, following the outbreak of World War II, the
collaboration with Nazis in various other countries. Given Weisberg's own
deep attachments to France, he is particularly (and rightly) concerned with

22. Id.
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the betrayal not only of universal, but also of particularly French, values by
Vichy France, which purported to be an official government representing the
French nation rather than a rag-tag group of opportunistic collaborators with
true evil.
An important part of his indictment involves what he believes to be a
loose, far-too-slippery, approach to texts, whether sacred (as with the
Christian (mis)interpretation of Jewish texts) or the legal texts of a mundane
polity. I suspect that Weisberg would be uncomfortable with this particular
analogy, but there is certainly more than a trace of the Lutheranism-"Here I
stand, I can do no other"-that Weber was in fact attacking in Politics as a
Vocation.23 I have no trouble agreeing with many of his particular
arguments about moral cowardice during the Vichy regime (and elsewhere).
Many people could have behaved more decently without, it appears, taking
inordinate risks. And, of course, some behaved decently even when they
knew that their own lives were at stake. These "righteous" persons should
be endlessly celebrated. That being said, even if one condemns the
particular leaders of Vichy France for an easy willingness to compromise,
one cannot elide the issue of what duties leaders have to make compromises
that, by definition, they would prefer not to make. Are Masada or, for
Texans, the Alamo, truly inspirational templates, or is timely negotiated
surrender that allows one's community to survive until another day at least
sometimes to be preferred to suicidal grand gestures? Would Weisberg have
joined those in the 1950s proclaiming "Better Dead Than Red" as a way of
defending the possibility of nuclear war and its consequences if faced with
unjustifiable incursions by the Soviet Union?
But, as a matter of fact, Weisberg does not confront what I regard as the
most important of my three examples presented in my Brandeis Lecture,
which involves decisions at the design stage of constitutions. Here, of
course, we are not discussing the interpretation of preexisting texts, but
rather deciding what should go in the texts themselves, whether the
substantive protection of certain political values (e.g., the guarantee against
abolition of the international slave trade until 1808) or the adoption of
political procedures that work, in context, to protect the forces of evil (e.g.,
the Three-Fifths Compromise). And, if one has decided, in the name of
political prudence, to make relevant compromises, either "rotten" or merely
"awful," then what is the interpreter's duty with regard to enforcing them in
the future?

23.

MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1918), reprintedin FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN

SOCIOLOGY 77-128 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946), availableat https://www.
d.umn.edu/-bmork/2 11 1/readings/weberpoliticsasavocation.htm.
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After all, Justice Joseph Story, in what I regard as the single most
appalling decision in our history, Priggv. Pennsylvania24 --yes, I do think it
is worse than Dred Scott2 5-claims in part to be the faithful enforcer of the
negotiated deal made in 1787 to construct (and then to preserve) a Union
even if that meant collaborating with slave masters and, in Prigg, slave
catchers. William Lloyd Garrison famously described the Constitution as a
"Covenant with Death" that demanded enforcement by judges with legal
integrity. This is why he believed that no honorable person should agree to
be a judge in such a system, precisely because there was no way to combine
both legal integrity and personal integrity. This was, as Weisberg well
knows, the topic of Bob Cover's great book, Justice Accused: Antislavery
and the JudicialProcess.2 6 The basic question, of course, is whether one
could always achieve what I have elsewhere termed "happy endings" by
(legitimately) manipulating legal texts to accord with the demands of justice
to which both Cover and Weisberg are so inspiringly committed. And if the
answer is no, then is the correct response not Garrisonian withdrawal from
the bench, but, rather, to engage in what would otherwise be illegitimate
manipulation in the name of the overriding moral value? (What would I
ever do without question marks?)
There are, obviously, no final answers to the questions raised by my five
interlocutors. What I am most confident of is that this conversation is very
much worth having and, even more, continuing. My fondest hope is that this
symposium-a word with a genealogy going back to the Platonic
dialogues-can prove useful to others in their own wrestling with truly
eternal questions (whether or not they have eternally true answers).

24. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1957).
26. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
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